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BLINKING ON THE BENCH: HOW JUDGES
DECIDE CASES
Chris Guthriet Jeffrey J. Rachlinskitt & Andrew J. Wistrichttt
How do judges judge? Do they apply law to facts in a mechanical and
deliberative way, as the formalists suggest they do, or do they rely on hunches
and gut feelings, as the realists maintain? Debate has raged for decades, but
researchers have offered little hard evidence in support of either model. Rely-
ing on empirical studies of judicial reasoning and decision making, we pro-
pose an entirely new model of judging that provides a more accurate
explanation ofjudicial behavior. Our model accounts for the tendency of the
human brain to make automatic, snap judgments, which are surprisingly
accurate, but which can also lead to erroneous decisions. I Equipped with a
better understanding ofjudging, we then propose several reforms that should
lead to more just and accurate outcomes.
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"I fear the judge who is too sure of himself, who reaches his decision
quickly, jumping immediately to conclusions without deliberation
or repentance."
2
INTRODUCTION
How dojudgesjudge? The answer to this seemingly simple ques-
tion has proved surprisingly elusive.
The two venerable models of judging-the formalist and realist
models-offer contrasting responses. According to the formalists,
judges apply the governing law to the facts of a case in a logical,
mechanical, and deliberative way. 3 For the formalists, the judicial sys-
tem is a "giant syllogism machine," and the judge acts like a "highly
skilled mechanic." 4 Legal realism, on the other hand, represents a
sharp contrast. According to the realists, judges follow an intuitive
process to reach conclusions which they only later rationalize with de-
liberative reasoning. 5 For the realists, the judge "decides by feeling,
and not by judgment; by 'hunching' and not by ratiocination" and
later uses deliberative faculties "not only to justify that intuition to
himself, but to make it pass muster."'6 Neither model has proved satis-
factory. Judges surely rely on intuition, rendering a purely formalist
2 PIERO CALAOMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 21 (John Clarke Adams & C. Abbott Phil-
lips, Jr. trans., 1942).
3 See Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism,
and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 421 (1992).
4 Id. For other depictions of the formalist approach to judging, see, for example,
BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 183 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 4th ed. 2006)
(1996) (describing formalist judicial decision making as "a nearly mechanical, nearly syllo-
gistic move from basic premises to undeniable conclusion"); Brian Leiter, Positivism, For-
malism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1145-46 (1999) (book review) (describing legal
formalism as a "descriptive theory of adjudication according to which (1) the law is ration-
ally determinate, and (2) judging is mechanical. It follows, moreover, from (1), that (3)
legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique
outcome; no recourse to non-legal reasons is demanded or required.").
5 See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., TheJudgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1929).
6 Id.; see a/SOJEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 111-12 (Anchor Books,
Peter Smith 1970) (1930) (characterizing Hutcheson's depiction ofjudging "as an approx-
imately correct description of how all judges do their thinking"); Hutcheson, supra note 5,
at 278-79 (describing his decision-making process as ajudge, Hutcheson writes, "I... give
my imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch-that
intuitive flash of understanding .... "). Note that scholars often distinguish between the
Frank/Hutcheson approach to realism and the more moderate approach taken by other
scholars in the legal realist movement. See Leiter, supra note 4, at 1148.
[Vol. 93:1
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model of judging clearly wrong, 7 yet they also appear able to apply
legal rules to facts, similarly disproving a purely realist model of
judging.8
In this Article, we argue and attempt to demonstrate that neither
the formalists nor the realists accurately describe the way judges make
decisions, but that key insights from each form the core of a more
accurate model.9 We propose a blend of the two that we call the "in-
tuitive-override" model of judging. Supported by contemporary psy-
chological research on the human mind and by our own empirical
evidence, this model posits that judges generally make intuitive deci-
sions but sometimes override their intuition with deliberation. Less
idealistic than the formalist model and less cynical than the realist
model, our model is best described as "realistic formalism." The
model is "realist" in the sense that it recognizes the important role of
the judicial hunch and "formalist" in the sense that it recognizes the
importance of deliberation in constraining the inevitable, but often
undesirable, influence of intuition.' 0
Our model departs significantly from recent research on judicial
decision making in two ways. First, most judicial scholars have studied
appellate judges, particularly Supreme Court justices,'1 and their po-
7 Most scholars seem to agree that formalism does not accurately describe the way
judges function. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 229 (1986)
("We are all [legal] realists now."); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113
YALE L.J. 1519, 1542 (2004) (book review) ("When legal scholars announce that 'we are all
legal realists now,' they usually mean that everyone now assumes that judicial opinions are
more than simply the scientific application of existing law to each new set of facts.").
8 H.L.A. Hart called the realists' notion that judges are not bound by rules a "great
exaggeration[ ]." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 144 (1994). In rejecting the idea
that deduction constrains judges, realism attracted much criticism. See Brian Leiter, Legal
Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 11 ETHICS 278, 278-79, 300 (2001) (noting that
Hart's critique of the realists in Chapter 7 of The Concept of Law turned Realism into a
"jurisprudential joke, a tissue of philosophical confusions"). Even many of the realists con-
ceded that judges were constrained by legal rules. SeeJoseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 471 (1988) (book review) ("The most convincing legal realists
argued that the reasoning demanded by judicial opinions substantially constrained
judges.").
9 We do not consider the legal positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart, and their critics, such
as Ronald Dworkin, as creating a theory of judicial decision making because they focus
largely on providing a theory of law, not a descriptive account ofjudging itself. See Michael
Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1915, 1917-18 (2005)
(distinguishing between theories of law and theories of adjudication); Leiter, supra note 4,
at 1140-44 (explaining that legal positivism is a theory of law, not a theory of
adjudication).
10 See R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 Hous. L.
REv. 1381, 1420 (2006) ("Deciding judicial cases inescapably requires the exercise of
intuition.").
II See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 4-5 (2006) ("[Pjrimary at-
tention to higher courts, especially the Supreme Court .... mirrors the subject matter of
scholarship on judicial behavior."); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
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litical "attitudes" or ideology.12 In contrast, our model arises from the
study of trial judges. This is an important distinction because trial
judges play a more prominent role in dispute resolution than do ap-
pellate judges. 13 Trial courts handle approximately 98% of the thirty-
five million cases that the federal 14 and state' 5 courts resolve each
year. Moreover, trial court decisions are generally final because ap-
peals are only available on limited bases, 16 occur infrequently,' 7 and
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 72-73 (1993). For an exception, see C. K. ROWLAND
& ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS &JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1996).
12 See LEE EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-12 (1998) (describ-
ing a political science approach to studying judges and the central role of judicial atti-
tudes); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 11, at 72-73 (arguing that political attitudes are the
primary influence on Supreme Court justices); HAROLDJ. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY
MAKING: EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION 113-18 (1979) (same).
13 In addition to presiding over jury trials, trial judges facilitate settlement, see, e.g.,
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982), resolve cases on
motion, see, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 592-93
(2004); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudica-
tions, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, I J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705, 706-07 (2004), and decide more cases in bench trials than there are jury
trials, see, e.g., Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Examin-
ing Tfial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 773-74 (2004).
14 Of the approximately 2.3 million cases resolved in the federal courts during the
2006 term, 97% were resolved in the trial courts rather than the appellate courts. To
derive this figure, we divided trial court resolutions (including bankruptcy court resolu-
tions) by total resolutions during 2006: (1) 67,530 criminal case resolutions in district
courts; (2) 281,220 civil case resolutions in district courts; (3) 1,889,778 resolutions in
bankruptcy court; (4) 66,792 resolutions in courts of appeals (excluding the Federal Cir-
cuit); and (5) 82 resolutions in the Supreme Court. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CASELOAD
INDICATORS, 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 1997, 2002, 2005, AND 2006, http://
www.uscourts.gov/caseload2006/front/marO6indicators.pdf (providing the District Court,
Bankruptcy Court, and United States Court of Appeals data); PUB. INFO. OFFICE, 2006 YEAR-
END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (2007), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/pub-
licinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf (providing the data for the Supreme Court).
15 Of the approximately 33 million court cases resolved in state courts during 2004
(the most recent year for which these data are available), 99% were resolved in the trial
courts rather than the appellate courts. To derive this figure, we divided the total number
of trial court resolutions in 2004 (32,137,043) by the total number of trial court resolutions
plus the total appellate caseload (288,614) in 2004. For these data, see STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2005 tbls. 1, 10, http://ivww.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2005_
files/State%20Court% 20Caseload% 20Statistics% 202005.pdf.
16 See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 11, at 3; see also Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of
Review, in RESTRU(C'TURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF "HE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE Fu-
TURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 30, 31 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (explaining that in
many instances, "the court of appeals [is] obliged by established standards to affirm unless,
for example, crucial fact findings were not merely in error but clearly so," and noting that
"[d]iscretionary rulings [have] to be not merely incorrect, but abusive" to be reversed).
17 See id. at 8 ("[O]nly about 20 percent of all district court cases are appealed in any
given year."); Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases:
Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 685
(2004) ("About 20 percent of cases with definitive trial courtjudgments generate appeals,
with tried cases appealed at about twice the rate of nontried cases."). But see Chris Guthrie
& Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights Into the "Affirmance Effect" on
HeinOnline  -- 93 Cornell L. Rev. 4 2007-2008
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seldom lead to reversal.'
Second, and relatedly, our model departs from prior research by
identifying judicial accuracy, notjudicial activism, as the most challeng-
ing issue facing the courts. As we demonstrate below, judges are
predominantly intuitive decision makers, and intuitive judgments are
often flawed. To be sure, intuition can lead to accurate decisions, as
Malcolm Gladwell documents in his bestseller, Blink,'9 while delibera-
tion can lead to error, as any court observer knows. But intuition is
generally more likely than deliberation to lead judges astray.2" We
suspect this happens with some frequency, but even if it is uncom-
mon, millions of litigants each year might be adversely affected byju-
dicial overreliance on intuition. Therefore, the justice system should
take steps to limit the impact of what we call "blinking on the
bench."'21
Eliminating all intuition fromjudicial decision making is both im-
possible and undesirable because it is an essential part of how the
human brain functions. 22 Intuition is dangerous not because people
rely on it but because they rely on it when it is inappropriate to do so.
We propose that, where feasible, judges should use deliberation to
check their intuition.
the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 361 fig.Ib (2005) (reporting
that the federal courts of appeal decide just under 30,000 cases on appeal each year).
Dividing the 30,000 appeals by the 2.3 million resolutions yields an appeal percentage of
only 1.3%.
18 See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 11, at 8 ("[Mlost appeals are unsuccessful, and, as
anticipated by the expanded fact freedom inherent in the evolution of fiduciary jurispru-
dence, the reversal rate is declining. For example, the reversal rate in 1960 was almost 25
percent; by 1990 it had declined to 16 percent. In combination, the low rates of appeal
and reversal ensure that only a very small number of district courts' judgments will be
reversed on appeal-about 3 percent(.20 x .16 = .032)."); Margaret A. Berger, When, If
Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992)
(finding only 30 trial verdicts in 1990 that were reversed for evidentiary error in the federal
courts); Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 665 ("4.3 percent of the 2.1 million district court
filings ended with an appellate court affirming the trial court and ... 1.3 percent of such
filings ended with an appellate court reversing the trial court. Thus, in rounded figures, 1
filing in 100 yields an appellate reversal. Simple computation reveals that about one-quar-
ter of 1 percent of all cases filed from 1987 through 1995 led to an appellate court reversal
of a trial outcome and that about one-half of 1 percent of such filed cases led to an appellate
court affirmance of a trial outcome."); Guthrie & George, supra note 17, at 358 ("Affir-
mances are a defining feature of the courts of appeals .
19 See GLADWELL, supra note 1.
20 See ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION 224 (2001) ("[B]oth the tacit [intui-
tive] and the deliberate systems have their advantages and disadvantages. But they must be
managed, and, for most people, this implies more active use of the deliberate system.").
21 Like Gladwell, we use the word "blink" to refer to the intuitive judgments made in
the first moments after encountering a new situation. See GL\DWELL, supra note 1, at 13-14
(discussing the "power of glance" derived from the first "two seconds" of experiencing
something).
22 See HOCAWerI-, supra note 20, at 66 ("[Tlhe tacit system accounts for most mental
activity.").
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In Part I of this Article, we present our intuitive-override model of
judging. In Part II, we present the results of our experimental re-
search on judges. We provide tests of judges' general reasoning skills
as well as their decision-making skills in legal contexts. Our results
demonstrate thatjudges, like others, commonly make judgments intu-
itively, rather than reflectively, both generally and in legal contexts.
Taken together, these data support our intuitive-override model.
Our model ofjudging raises two important questions for litigants,
lawyers, judges, and the architects of the civil and criminal justice sys-
tems. First, which of the two decision-making approaches-intuitive
or deliberative-is preferable? For reasons we explain below, we be-
lieve deliberative decision making is more likely than intuitive deci-
sion making to lead to just outcomes. Second, what might the justice
system do to induce judges to decide matters more deliberatively and
to produce more accurate outcomes? In Part III, we identify several
concrete measures which the civil and criminal justice systems might
implement to promote deliberative decision making.
I
THE INTUITIVE-OVERRIDE MODEL OF JUDGING
Our intuitive-override model of judging recognizes two distinct
methods of judicial decision-making processes: intuitive and
deliberative.
A. Dual-Process Models of Judgment
Philosophers have long distinguished between intuition and de-
duction. 23 Descartes, for example, claimed that "intuition and deduc-
tion" are the two processes "by means of which we [are able to] arrive
at a knowledge of things."24 Likewise, Pascal distinguished between
the "intuitive" mind and the "geometric" mind.25 "[W]ith the intui-
tive mind," he explained, "principles are in common use and before
everybody's eyes. You have only to look, and no effort is necessary. ' 26
In the "geometric" mind, by contrast, "principles are obvious, but re-
23 See, e.g., Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Uncon-
scious, 49 Am. PSYCHOL. 709, 712 (1994) ("Awareness of a distinction between an experien-
tial and a rational mode of processing information has a long history, predating psychology
as a formal discipline."); Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT 379, 380 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin &
Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (observing that the distinction between intuition and delib-
eration "has not been missed by philosophers or psychologists" and "can be traced back to
Aristotle").
24 RENt DESCARTES, RULES FOR THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL INTELLIGENCE 79
(George Heffernan ed. & trans., Rodopi 1998).
25 BLAISE PASCAL, PENS9ES 207 (Roger Ariew ed. & trans., Hackett Publ'g Co., Inc.
2005) (1670).
26 Id.
[Vol. 93:1
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moved from ordinary use, so that we find it difficult to turn our head
in that direction, for lack of habit. 27
Building on these insights and on decades of research on judg-
ment and choice, psychologists have proposed more than a dozen dif-
ferent dual-system or two-process models of cognition. 28  Although
such models vary, they all distinguish between intuitive processes and
deliberative processes.29
Intuitive processes, also called "System 1" processes,3 0 "occur
spontaneously and do not require or consume much attention."' '
They are "automatic, heuristic-based, and relatively undemanding of
computational capacity." 3 2 Simply stated, they are "spontaneous, intu-
itive, effortless, and fast."'3 3 Emotional influences also tend to arise
through System 1 processes. 34 Deliberative processes, also called "Sys-
tem 2" processes,3 5 are "mental operations requiring effort, motiva-
tion, concentration, and the execution of learned rules." 36 Associated
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 21 ("The term tacit system is meant to encom-
pass all processes that occur tacitly or automatically, that is, largely without use of conscious
attention .... The term deliberate system is meant to encompass all processes that require
effort, that is, attention and deliberation."); Epstein, supra note 23, at 711 tbl. 1, 715-19
(proposing a "cognitive-experiential self-theory" which includes an "experiential" system
and a "rational" system); Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Reason-
ing, 75 BRIT.J. PSYCHOL. 451 (1984) (proposing a dual system model including a "heuristic"
system and an "analytic" system); Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness
Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT, supra note 23, at 49, 51-60 (making a dual-process claim and
proposing their own model); Sloman, supra note 23, at 380-84 (proposing a dual system
model with an "associative" system and a "rule-based" system); Keith E. Stanovich & Rich-
ard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at 421,
436-38 (observing the burgeoning dual system models). See generally DUAL-PROCEss THEO-
RIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (providing a collec-
tion of articles on various dual-process theories).
29 See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 28, at 51.
30 Stanovich & West, supra note 28, at 436 (devising this label).
31 Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26
(2005); see also KENNETH R. HAMMOND, HUMAN JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: IRREDUCIBLE
UNCERTAINTY, INEVITABLE ERROR, UNAVOIDABLE INJUSTICE 60 (1996) ("The ordinary mean-
ing of intuition signifies ... a cognitive process that somehow produces an answer, solu-
tion, or idea without the use of a conscious, logically defensible, step-by-step process.").
32 Stanovich & West, supra note 28, at 436; see also HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 14
("[T]he essence of intuition or intuitive responses is that they are reached with little appar-
ent effort, and typically without conscious awareness. They involve little or no conscious
deliberation." (emphasis omitted)).
33 Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 28, at 49 (referencing Tversky and Kahneman's
earlier study of mathematically oriented p ychologists).
34 See Seymour Epstein & Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding Dual-Process The-
ories from the Perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 28, at 462, 469 ("[T]he experiential system [ System 1] is
emotionally driven.").
35 Stanovich & West, supra note 28, at 436 (adopting this label).
36 Frederick, supra note 31, at 26.
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with "controlled processing,13 7 they are "deliberate, rule-governed, ef-
fortful, and slow."' 38 Table 1 summarizes the differences between the
two systems of processing. 39
TABLE 1: A COMPARISON OF THE Two SYSTEMS OF PROCESSING
Characteristic System 1 System 2
(Intuitive) (Deliberative)
Cognitive Style Heuristic Systematic
Cognitive Awareness Low High
Conscious Control Low High
Automaticity High Low
Speed Fast Slow
Reliability Low High
Effort Low High
Emotional Valence High Low
The relationship between the intuitive and the deliberative sys-
tems is complicated. Because intuition is automatic, quick, and easily
invoked, it can easily dominate deliberation as decision makers simply
rely on a quick, intuitive response or as intuition affects the judgments
that follow. 40 Intuition can be surprisingly accurate, but sometimes
good judgment will require purging the deliberative processes of intu-
ition's influence. 41 Intuitive responses can also emerge from repeti-
tion of the same deliberative procedure. 42 Furthermore, some
decisions might require shifting between the two systems. 4 3
Our proposed dual-process model ofjudging, which is based on a
general model developed by Daniel Kahneman and Shane Freder-
ick,44 posits that judges make initial intuitive judgments (System 1),
which they might (or might not) override with deliberation (System
37 Stanovich & West, supra note 28, at 436.
-38 Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 28, at 49 (referencing Tversky and Kahneman's
earlier study of mathematically oriented psychologists).
-9 We derived this table from Pat Croskerry, The Theory and Practice of Clinical Decision-
Making, CANADIAN J. ANESTHESIA, June 1, 2005, at RI & tbl. 1.
40 See HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 14 ("[E]ven if responses do involve conscious delib-
eration, the outcome may still depend on a set of initial intuitions.").
41 See id.
42 See id. at 22 ("[I]f deliberate-system actions are repeated over time, they can move
to the domain of the tacit system.").
43 See id. ("[M]any cognitive activities do not rely on one system alone. [Ilnitial
thoughts in a given situation may be the product of the tacit system at work, but these
thoughts may be modified, amplified, or even rejected by the deliberate system."). For a
model ofjudging that incorporates this kind of interaction, see Dan Simon, A Third View of
the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 512-13
(2004) (proposing an alternate approach to classifying legal decision making as "coher-
ence-based reasoning").
44 See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 28, at 51.
[Vol. 93:1
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2). As Kahneman and Frederick explain: "System 1 quickly proposes
intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2
monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct,
or override. The judgments that are eventually expressed are called
intuitive if they retain the hypothesized initial proposal without much
modification." 45 This model is similar to the one developed by psy-
chologist Steven Sloman. 46 He uses the terms "associative" rather
than System 1 or intuitive, and "rule-based" rather than System 2 or
deliberative, 4 7 but he conceives of the judgment process in substan-
tially the same way:
Both systems seem to try, at least some of the time, to generate a
response. The rule-based system can suppress the response of the
associative system in the sense that it can overrule it. However, the
associative system always has its opinion heard and, because of its
speed and efficiency, often precedes and thus neutralizes the rule-
based response.
48
Our model, in short, views judges neither as the purely deductive
decision makers envisioned by the formalists nor as the intuitive ra-
tionalizers envisioned by the early realists. Rather, it views judges as
ordinary people who tend to make intuitive, System 1 decisions, but
who can override their intuitive reactions with complex, deliberative
thought.
49
45 Id.
46 See Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 3, 6 (1996); see also Stanovich & West, supra note 28, at 439 ("[O]ne of the functions
of System 2 is to override some of the automatic contextualization provided by System 1.").
This model also bears some resemblance to the more general "inferential correction"
model ofjudgment proposed by Daniel Gilbert. See Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT, supra note 23, at 167,
167 ("[O]ne of psychology's fundamental insights is that judgments are generally the prod-
ucts of nonconscious systems that operate quickly, on the basis of scant evidence, and in a
routine manner, and then pass their hurried approximations to consciousness, which
slowly and deliberately adjusts them.").
47 Sloman, supra note 46.
48 Sloman, supra note 23, at 391.
49 The convergence of psychologists on the notion that two separate systems of rea-
soning coexist in the human brain is remarkable. Psychologists Seymour Epstein, Steve
Sloman, Dan Gilbert, Shelley Chaiken, and Daniel Kahneman come from diverse schools
of thought, and yet all have settled on the same ideas about the dual-process models. Fur-
thermore, these dual-process models find support from evolutionary psychology and
neuropsychology. The brain consists of overlapping systems, each of which developed at a
different point in the human evolutionary past. Contemporary neuropsychology supports
the point. Studies of brain function reveal that people use different parts of the brain for
different kinds of decisions. MRI scans of the brain reveal that the prefrontal lobes are
most active when people are making deliberative decisions. See ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE
EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 69-70 (2001); Matthew D. Lie-
berman, Ruth Gaunt, Daniel T. Gilbert & Yaacov Trope, Reflexion and Reflection: A Social
Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to Attributional Inference, 34 ADVANCES IN ExPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 199, 235 (2002). By contrast, the lateral temporal lobes, amygdala, and basal
ganglia are active during intuitive, reflexive thought. See Daniel Schreiber & Marco
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B. The Cognitive Reflection Test
The simplest and perhaps most powerful illustration of dual
processing comes from Shane Frederick's "Cognitive Reflection Test"
(CRT), 5° which lately has attracted much attention in both the aca-
demic and popular press. 51 The CRT is a three-item test designed to
distinguish intuitive from deliberative processing. 52 More precisely,
the CRT measures "cognitive reflection," which Frederick describes as
"the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first
comes to mind. '5 3 The CRT appears in its entirety in Figure 1 below:
FIGURE 1: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST5 4
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?
-cents
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets?
minutes
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for
the patch to cover half of the lake?
-days
Each of the three CRT items has a correct answer that is easy to
discern upon reflection, yet each also has an intuitive-but incor-
rect-answer that almost immediately comes to mind. Consider the
first question. For many people, the answer that immediately jumps
to mind is ten cents. 55 Though intuitive, this answer is wrong, as a bit
of reflection shows. If the ball costs ten cents and the bat costs one
dollar more, the bat must cost $1.10. Adding those two figures to-
gether, the total cost of the bat and ball would be $1.20, not $1.10.
Therefore, the correct answer is five cents-the ball costs five cents,
the bat costs $1.05, and together they cost $1.10.
For the second question, the answer that immediately jumps to
mind is 100 minutes.5 6 Though intuitive, this answer is also wrong. If
lacoboni, Evaluating Political Questions: Evaluation from Functional Brain Imaging 7-8 (Sept.
1, 2004) (Harvard Univ. Weatherhead Ctr. for Int'l Affairs Paper), available at http://
www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/Schreiber2004.pdf.
50 Frederick, supra note 31, at 26-28.
51 See, e.g., Virginia Postrel, Would You Take the Bird in the Hand, or a 75 % Chance at the
Two in the Bush, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at C3; Peter Ranscombe, The Three Questions that
Will Show How Clever (or Not) You Really Are, SCOTSMAN, July 16, 2005, http://
news.scotsman.com/uk.cfm?id=1636262005.
52 See Frederick, supra note 31, at 27.
53 Id. at 35.
54 Id. at 27 fig.1.
55 See id. at 26-27.
56 See id. at 27.
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five machines make five widgets in five minutes, then each machine
makes one widget in that five-minute time period. Thus, it would take
only five minutes for 100 machines to produce 100 widgets,just as 200
machines would make 200 widgets during that same period.5 7
The third question immediately invites an answer of twenty-four
days, which is wrong.58 The correct answer-obvious upon reflec-
tion-is forty-seven days. If the patch of lily pads doubles each day
and covers the entire lake on the forty-eighth day, it must cover half
the lake the day before.
The CRT items are simple in that "their solution is easily under-
stood when explained, yet reaching the correct answer often requires
the suppression of an erroneous answer that springs 'impulsively' to
mind."5) Most people, it turns out, are unable or unwilling to sup-
press that impulsive response.601 In thirty-five separate studies involv-
ing 3428 respondents, Frederick found that subjects on average
correctly answered 1.24 of the three items, although results varied
across the subject pools. 6 1 For example, students at the University of
Toledo obtained an average score of .57, while students at MIT ob-
tained an average score of 2.18.62 Among all of the subjects tested,
only 17% answered all three questions correctly, while nearly twice
that many (33%) answered all three questions incorrectly. 63
Although the CRT consists of only three items, it correlates highly
with the Wonderlic Personnel Test 64 (an intelligence test used by,
among others, the National Football League 65 ), the SAT, 66 and the
57 This problem implicitly assumes that each machine produces widgets at the same
rate. Given the structure of the problem as well as the responses of subjects, we believe
that subjects adopt that same assumption when confronted with this problem.
58 See Frederick, supra note 31, at 27.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 28, 29 tbl. 1.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 29.
63 See id. Among his other results, Frederick found that CRT scores correlate with
time preferences. See id. at 30-32. Those who scored higher on the CRT were generally
more willing to delay gratification and reward. See id. at 30-31. In addition, Frederick
found that those who score higher on the CRT prefer the New Yorker to People magazine,
whereas those who score lower on the CRT prefer People to the New Yorker. See id. at 39-40
n.15. Furthermore, Frederick found that CRT scores also correlate with risk preferences-
those with high CRT scores are less likely to be influenced by the characterization of deci-
sion options as gains or losses from the status quo. See id. at 33 ("In the domain of gains,
the high CRT group was more willing to gamble .... For items involving losses .... the
high CRT group was less risk seeking ...."). Finally, Frederick found that men scored
higher than women on the CRT-a result that he was not able to explain. See id. at 37-38.
64 See id. at 33-35. The correlation between the CRT and the Wonderlic Personality
Test is .43. Id. at 35 tbl. 4.
65 See id. at 33-34.
66 See id. at 35. The correlation between the CRT and the SAT as a whole is 0.44. Id.
at 35 tbl. 4.
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ACT.6 7 While the CRT acts as an abbreviated IQ test by measuring
some component of intelligence, it would be a mistake to think of the
CRT as simply that.68 The CRT assesses a subset of what psychologists
include in measures of intelligence-the capability and willingness to
deliberate to solve a problem when intuition would lead one astray.69
The CRT illustrates the predominance of intuition over delibera-
tion in three ways. First, adults perform poorly on the CRT, even
though the questions are simple upon reflection.7 0 Adults actually
perform better on structurally similar problems that are more difficult,
such as when the problem invites computation rather than impulse.7 '
By way of illustration, Frederick explains that subjects "miss the 'bat
and ball' problem far more often than they miss the 'banana and ba-
gel' problem: 'A banana and a bagel cost 37 cents. The banana costs
13 cents more than the bagel. How much does the bagel cost?' '"72
Second, among all potentially incorrect responses to the CRT
questions, the intuitive answers identified above are most common.7 3
By assessing "introspection, verbal reports and scribbles in the mar-
gin," Frederick found that even those subjects who responded cor-
rectly often considered the intuitive answer before selecting the
correct answer.
7 4
Third, subjects who selected the intuitive answers were more
likely than those who answered correctly to indicate that the problems
were easy.7 5 In the bat-and-ball problem, Frederick found that sub-
jects who provided the intuitive response predicted that 92% of peo-
ple would solve the problem correctly, while subjects who responded
correctly predicted that only 62% of people would do so. 76
In sum, responses on the CRT provide evidence that ordinary
adults possess dual-processing systems in which intuition tends to
dominate, but can be overcome by deliberation. But what about
67 See id. at 35. The correlation between the CRT and the ACT is 0.46. Id. at 35 tbl. 4.
68 See id. at 33-37.
69 See id. at 35. Frederick is a bit coy about what the CRT attempts to measure, how-
ever. His assertion that it measures "the ability or disposition to resist reporting the re-
sponse that first comes to mind" is somewhat vague. Id. at 35. The CRT might measure
the decision maker's willingness to attend carefully to problems or ability to detect problems
that produce intuitive but inaccurate answers. If the former, the CRT might shed little
light on the behavior ofjudges, who might well be more willing to expend cognitive effort
on the cases before them than on the abstract problems in the CRT. But the surprisingly
high correlation between the CRT and other standard measures of intelligence suggests
that the test measures the latter.
70 See id. at 27.
71 See id. at 28.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 27.
74 Id.
75 See id.
76 Id.
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judges? On the one hand, it would be surprising ifjudges used mark-
edly different decision-making processes; judges, after all, are human
beings with the same cognitive machinery as everyone else. On the
other hand, judges' education, intelligence, and on-the-job training as
professional decision makers might distinguish them from most of the
rest of the population.
II
TESTING THE MODEL
To explore whether judges make judgments consistent with our
intuitive-override model, we measured their performance on the CRT
and on a series of judicial decision-making problems. This work,
which we describe in detail below, supports our theory thatjudges rely
largely on intuition but sometimes override that intuition with deduc-
tive reasoning.
A. The CRT and Trial Judges
To explore whether judges behave like Frederick's subjects, we
included the CRT in a five-item questionnaire we administered to 295
circuit court judges attending the Annual Business Meeting of the
Florida Conference of Circuit Judges in Naples, Florida, on June 12,
2006. Florida's circuit court judges are the principal trial judges in
the State. Of the 295 judges who returned surveys, 252 completed all
of the items on the CRT, 77 meaning that nearly half of the circuit
court judges in the Florida state courts completed the CRT.7 8
At this conference, we presented a plenary educational session to
the judges entitled, 'Judicial Decision Making." Although we do not
have an exact count of the conference attendees, most of the judges
participating in the conference attended our session. No other ses-
sions ran at the same time. At the outset of our session, we distributed
questionnaires to the judges in person and asked them to read and
respond to each of the questions independently. The materials con-
tained a cover page that indicated the name of the conference and
provided the following instructions:
Many of the points to be discussed at this session are best ex-
perienced directly. We therefore ask that before the session starts,
you read and respond to each of the questions enclosed in this sur-
77 Seven judges answered none of the questions, and 288judges answered at least one
of the questions. In our analysis, we include only the 252 judges who answered all three
questions.
78 See TOTAL STATEWIDE JUDGESHIPs: FISCAL YEAR 1972-73 To FISCAL YEAR 2007-08
(2007), http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/stats/bin/legauthorizedjudgesforweb.pdf
(reporting that there were 564 circuit courtjudgeships in Florida during the 2005-06 fiscal
year and 599 during the 2006-07 fiscal year).
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vey (although doing so is voluntary, of course). Please do so inde-
pendently. Please do not discuss these materials while you are
reviewing them, and please review the materials in the order
presented. We shall collect these surveys before the discussion and
present the results during this session.
At the beginning of the session, one of us (Wistrich) introduced'
himself and asked the judges to read and respond to the survey. He
requested that they do so quietly, assured them that we were not col-
lecting their names or other identifying information, and informed
them that we would present a summary of the results at the end of the
session. The judges appeared to take the questionnaires seriously.
The room was silent during the administration of the questionnaires,
which took approximately fifteen minutes.
Because we did not ask the judges to identify themselves, all re-
sponses were anonymous. We also informed the judges that participa-
tion was entirely voluntary. The final page of the questionnaires
allowed the judges to limit the use of their answers to discussion dur-
ing their particular conference, thereby excluding their answers from
discussion in other contexts and from use in any publication. One
judge exercised this option and we have excluded that judge's re-
sponses from our analysis. The CRT was the fourth item in our ques-
tionnaire. The last page of the questionnaire asked the judges to
provide basic demographic information, including: their gender; the
number of years of experience they have had as a judge; the major
political party in the United States with which they most closely iden-
tify; the areas of judicial work in which they have had experience
(civil, criminal, family, probate, or other); and their prior professional
experiences.
At the top of the page on which we reproduced the CRT, we pro-
vided the same instructions Frederick provided to his subjects: "Below
are several problems that vary in difficulty. Try to answer as many as
you can."79 Beneath the instructions, we reproduced the CRT, and
beneath each of the CRT items we asked the judges to predict "[w] hat
percentage of the judges in this room do you think will obtain the
correct answer on this problem?" 80
The judges obtained an average CRT score of 1.23 out of a possi-
ble 3.00. This score is slightly higher than the average that student
subjects at Michigan achieved and slightly lower than the average stu-
dent subjects at Harvard achieved.8 1 Nearly one-third of the judges
79 See Frederick, supra note 31, at 28.
80 See stimulus materials on file with the authors.
81 Frederick, supra note 31, at 29 thl. 1. Our results might overstate the judges' abili-
ties on this problem because we excluded from the analysis the 43 judges who failed to
answer all three questions. It is possible that these judges did not respond because they
wanted to avoid answering questions they found difficult. Among the 36 judges who an-
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(77 of 252 judges, or 30.6%) failed to answer a single question cor-
rectly; a similar number (78 out of 252 judges, or 31.0%) answered
one question correctly; while less than one-quarter (60 out of 252
judges, or 23.8%) answered two questions correctly; and roughly one
seventh (37 out of 252judges, or 14.7%) answered all three questions
correctly. That the judges produced results consistent with those of
college students at highly selective universities suggests that the judges
performed comparably to other well-educated adults.
TABLE 2: OVERALL CRT RESULTS: JUDGES COMPARED TO OTHERS8 2
Percent Percent Percent Percent
with 0 with I with 2 with 3
Sample (n) Mean correct correct correct correct
MIT (61) 2.18 7 16 30 48
Carnegie Mellon (746) 1.51 25 25 25 25
Harvard (51) 1.43 20 37 24 20
Florida judges (192) 1.23 31 31 24 15
Michigan/Ann Arbor (1267) 1.18 31 33 23 14
Bowling Green (52) 0.87 50 25 13 12
Michigan State (118) 0.79 49 29 16 6
Toledo (138) 0.57 64 21 10 5
The judges' performance improved as they progressed through
the three questions, scoring 28.2%, 44.0%, and 50.4% correct on the
first, second, and third questions, respectively. At first glance, that re-
sult seems odd because the second question is computationally more
challenging than the first, yet more judges answered it correctly.
Frederick's discussion of the CRT, however, predicts precisely this pat-
tern because the second question seems more difficult than the first,
which suggests to the test taker that reliance on intuition might be
unwise.8 3
swered only one or two questions, the percentage of correct answers was 27.4% (17 out of
62), which is a little lower than the percentage correct among judges who answered all
three questions (41%). The pattern of nonresponses, however, produced a dizzying array
of combinations that does not clearly support any prediction as to how these judges would
have performed if they had answered all three questions: 7 declined to answer any of the
questions; 6 answered only the first question (5 of those answered it incorrectly); 4 an-
swered only the second question (2 of these answered it incorrectly); 22 answered the first
two questions (12 answered them both incorrectly, 2 answered them both correctly, I an-
swered the first one correctly and the second incorrectly, and 7 answered the first one
incorrectly and the second correctly); 3 answered only the first and third questions (2
answered them both incorrectly and I answered the first one incorrectly and the third one
correctly); and 1 answered only the second and third questions (and answered the second
question incorrectly and the third one correctly).
82 CRT scores for test takers other than Florida judges are taken from Frederick, supra
note 31, at 29 tbl. 1.
83 See Frederick, sura note 31, at 27-28.
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The judges who answered incorrectly tended to select the intui-
tively obvious, but inaccurate, responses. On the bat-and-ball ques-
tion, 88.4% of those answering incorrectly (175 of 181 judges)
provided the intuitive answer (10 cents). On the widget question,
57.4% of those answering incorrectly (81 of 141 judges) provided the
intuitive answer (100 minutes). And on the lily pad question, 68% of
those answering incorrectly (85 of 125 judges) provided the intuitive
answer (24 days). 8 4
TABLE 3: CRT RESULTS OF THE 252 JUDGES WHO ANSWERED Am,
THREE QUESTIONS
Percent incorrect; Percent incorrect;
Percent giving the intuitive giving any other
accurate (n) response (n) response (n)
Question 1 28.2% (71) 69.4% (175) 2.4% (6)
Question 2 44.0% (111) 32.1% (81) 23.8% (60)
Question 3 50.4% (127) 33.7% (85) 15.9% (40)
Finally, the judges who selected the intuitive, but incorrect, an-
swers to a question were more likely than the judges who answered
that question correctly to indicate that the question was easy. Table 4
reports these results.
TABLE 4: JUDGES' MEAN AND MEDIAN ESTIMATES OF THE PERCENTAGE
OF OTHER JUDGES WHO WOULD GET EACH CRT ITEM CORRECT, BY
ITEM AND BY JUDGES' ANSWERS (AMONG THE 252 JUDGES WHO
ANSWERED ALL THREE QUESTIONS)
Judges Giving
Judges Giving the Judges Giving the Unintuitive Wrong
Question Correct Answer Intuitive Wrong Answer Answers
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Percent (n) Percent Percent (n) Percent Percent (n) Percent
1 64.6% (67) 75.0% 91.3% (168) 100.0% 53.3% (6) 50.0%
2 70.9% (104) 75.0% 80.9% (79) 95.0% 68.1% (57) 75.0%
3 67.6% (115) 75.0% 71.2% (82) 87.5% 36.2% (39) 25.0%
On the first question, the mean estimate of the percentage of
judges who would answer the question correctly among those who se-
lected the intuitive answer was 91.3%, while the mean estimate among
judges who answered the question correctly was only 64.6%. This dif-
84 For our purposes, the CRT results are interesting primarily because our subjects
are trial judges, and we are interested in understanding judicial decision making. These
results should be of more general interest as well because as far as we know, our subjects
are among the first nonstudent subjects to take the CRT and the first group of expert
decision makers to take the test. See id. at 29 tbl. 1.
[Vol. 93:1
HeinOnline  -- 93 Cornell L. Rev. 16 2007-2008
2007] BLINKING ON THE BENCH
ference was statistically significant.8 5 This gap diminished on the sub-
sequent problems, but it did not disappear. On the second question,
the mean estimate among judges who provided the intuitive answer
was 80.9% versus 70.9% among those who provided the correct an-
swer. This difference was also statistically significant: 6 And on the
third question, the mean estimate of those who provided the intuitive
answer was 71.2% versus 67.6% among those judges who answered
correctly. This difference was not statistically significant.87
The demographic characteristics of the judges (gender, years of
experience, and political party) did not correlate with CRT scores.
The 185 male judges scored a mean of 1.28, while the 58 female
judges scored a mean of 1.21. This difference was not statistically sig-
nificant.88 The correlation coefficient between years of experience
and CRT score was .06, which was also not significant.8 9 Finally, the
88 judges reporting that they most closely identified with the Demo-
cratic Party scored a mean of 1.16, while the 121 judges who identified
with the Republican Party scored a mean of 1.24. This difference also
was not significant.90
Collectively, these results suggest thatjudges tended to favor intu-
itive rather than deliberative faculties. First, the judges had trouble
with the CRT, even though the CRT questions are not difficult. Most
85 We performed this analysis with a one-way ANOVA with three levels corresponding
to the three possible answers (correct, wrong-intuitive, and wrong-other). The ANOVA
revealed significant difference among the groups. F(2, 238) = 37.99, p < .001. Post hoc
analysis using Tukey's familywise errors revealed that all three groups were significantly
different from each other.
86 We performed this analysis with a one-way ANOVA with three levels, corresponding
to the three possible answers (correct, wrong-intuitive, and wrong-other). The ANOVA
revealed significant difference among the groups. F(2, 237) = 4.63, p = .011. Post hoc
analysis using Tukey's familywise errors revealed that all the judges who provided the intui-
tive answer differed significantly from the judges who provided the correct answer and
from the judges who provided other wrong answers. The judges who provided the correct
answers did not differ significantly from the judges who provided nonintuitive wrong
answers.
87 We performed this analysis with a one-way ANOVA with three levels, corresponding
to the three possible answers (correct, wrong-intuitive, and wrong-other). The ANOVA
revealed significant difference among the groups. F(2, 233) = 22.08, p < .001. Post hoc
analysis using Tukey's familywise errors revealed that the significant result here was driven
entirely by the judges who provided nonintuitive wrong answers. Thejudges who answered
correctly did not provide significantly different estimates from judges who provided intui-
tive answers.
88 t(241) = 1.02, p = .31. Note that 9 of the 252 judges who answered all three CRT
questions failed to identify their gender. In his work Frederick found a greater tendency
for men to score higher than women. See Frederick, supra note 31, at 37-38.
89 The ordered logit regression of CRT score on years of experience did not produce
a significant relationship. F(1,236) = 0.79, p = 0.375. Note that 14 of the 252 judges who
answered all three CRT questions failed to identify the number of years of experience they
had had as a judge.
90 t(207) = 0.55, p = .58. Note that 43 of the 252 judges who answered all three CRT
questions failed to identify their political party.
HeinOnline  -- 93 Cornell L. Rev. 17 2007-2008
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
of the judges answered most of the questions wrong. Second, when
the judges erred, they generally chose the intuitive answer. Third,
those judges who selected the intuitive answer indicated that the prob-
lem was easier than those judges who suppressed their intuition and
provided a deliberative answer.
Despite the predominantly intuitive responses the judges pro-
vided, the judges also demonstrated that they can override their intui-
tive responses. Roughly two-thirds of the participants answered one or
more of the CRT problems deliberatively, 91 and roughly one-seventh
of the judges answered all three deliberatively.92 This put the judges
in good company, obtaining scores relatively close to those of Harvard
undergraduates. 93 Nevertheless, the profession of judging clearly
does not attract exclusively deductive, System 2 thinkers.
To be sure, the judges undoubtedly exercise greater care when
ruling in court than when responding to CRT questions at an educa-
tional conference. Moreover, we did not provide any tangible incen-
tive to the judges, in contrast to Frederick, who paid subjects in most
of his studies $8 to complete a lengthy questionnaire. 94 We do not
believe that either of these factors undermine our results, however.
First, although Frederick paid his subjects, he paid them only for par-
ticipation, not for correct responses.95 Second, even though we did
not provide tangible incentives, we informed the judges that we in-
tended to share their collective results with the group, which probably
induced many judges to try to solve these problems correctly. Third,
the judges appeared to take our questionnaires quite seriously, com-
pleting them in a quiet and focused manner. Fourth, although this is
admittedly anecdotal, the judges appeared deeply interested in learn-
ing the results of the CRT; in subsequent break-out sessions they
wanted to discuss these results more than any of the other materials
we presented. Fifth, incentives do not always improve judgment and
decision making.96 Finally, in contrast to Frederick, who embedded
the CRT in a questionnaire designed to take 45 minutes to complete,
we included the CRT in a five-item questionnaire designed to take
only 15 minutes.97 Thus, the judges participating in our study were
likely less mentally taxed, under less time pressure, and more attentive
than were the subjects participating in Frederick's studies. We cannot
91 See supra Part I.B.
92 See id.
93 See Frederick, supra note 31, at 29 tbl. 1.
94 See id. at 28.
95 See id.
96 See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor Production Framework, 19 J. RisK & UNCERTAINTY 7
(1999) (reporting mixed evidence of incentive effects).
97 See Frederick, supra note 31, at 28.
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eliminate the possibility that more highly motivated judges might per-
form better on the CRT tasks, but we suspect that even highly moti-
vated judges would produce similar results.
B. Studies of Judicial Decision Making
The CRT results suggest that judges tend to make ordinary judg-
ments intuitively. The fact that judges demonstrate a predominantly
intuitive approach to the CRT questions does not necessarily mean
that they make predominantly intuitive judgments as judges. In recent
years, however, we have conducted several studies involving hundreds
of federal and state trial judges around the nation, and we have found
that judges commonly encounter stimuli on the job that induce intui-
tive reactions, though they occasionally demonstrate an ability to over-
ride those intuitive responses. 98 We do not intend to catalog our
results here. But to illustrate the claim we make in this paper, we
describe three examples of howjudges react to cues that trigger intui-
tive decision making. Specifically, we explore how judges respond to
numeric anchors, evaluate statistical evidence, and assess conduct af-
ter learning an outcome associated with that conduct. Collectively,
this research shows that judges tend to make decisions in a largely
intuitive way.
1. Intuitive Judging-Anchoring
The first example of intuitive judicial decision making arises from
studies of a phenomenon that psychologists call "anchoring."99 When
making numeric estimates, people commonly rely on the initial value
available to them.100 This initial value provides a starting point that
"anchors" the subsequent estimation process. 01 People generally ad-
just away from the anchor, but typically fail to adjust sufficiently,
thereby giving the anchor greater influence on the final estimate than
it should have. 10 2 In short, "the number that starts the generation of a
98 See Chris Guthrie,JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 779-80 (2001) (reporting experimental evidence showing that
judges are susceptible to heuristics and biases when making judgments);JeffreyJ. Rachlin-
ski, Chris Guthrie & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv.
1227, 1229-30 (2006) (exploring whether specialized, bankruptcy judges are similarly sus-
ceptible to heuristics and biases); AndrewJ. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie &JeffreyJ. Rachlinski,
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA.
L. REv. 1251, 1258-59 (2005) (reporting experimental evidence showing that judges have
difficulty deliberately disregarding relevant but inadmissible evidence when making merits
decisions).
99 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128 (1974) (identifying anchoring).
100 See id.
101 See id. ("[D]ifferent starting points yield different estimates, which are biased to-
ward the initial values.").
102 See id.
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judgment exerts a stronger impact than do subsequent pieces of
numeric information."' ' 3
We have found that anchors trigger intuitive judicial decision
making.10 4 In one study, we demonstrated that a demand made at a
prehearing settlement conference anchored judges' assessments of
the appropriate amount of damages to award.' 0 5 In that study, we
randomly assigned the participating judges to either a control group
or an anchor group and presented them with a lengthy vignette
describing a civil case in which the plaintiff had suffered multiple inju-
ries in a car accident caused by a negligent truck driver:
Imagine that you are presiding over an automobile accident case in
which the parties have agreed to a bench trial. The plaintiff is a 31-
year-old male schoolteacher and the defendant is a large package-
delivery service. The plaintiff was sideswiped by a truck driven errat-
ically by one of the defendant's drivers. As a result of the accident,
the plaintiff broke three ribs and severely injured his right arm. He
spent a week in the hospital, and missed six weeks of work. The
injuries to his right arm were so severe as to require amputation.
(He was right-handed.)' 0 6
We informed the judges that they had presided over an unsuccessful
settlement conference in this case. The judges in the control group
learned that the plaintiff's lawyer had told them at the settlement con-
ference that the plaintiff "was intent upon collecting a significant
monetary payment." The judges in the high anchor group learned
that the plaintiffs lawyer had demanded $10 million. We asked the
judges in both groups to indicate the amount of compensatory dam-
ages they would award the plaintiff.
The $10 million anchor influenced the judges. Judges in the con-
trol group awarded a mean amount of $808,000 and a median
amount of $700,000, while judges in the anchor group awarded a
much larger mean of $2,210,000 and median of $1 million.10 7 Table 5
shows the impact the anchor had on their judgment.
103 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Heuristic Strategies for Estimation Under Uncertainty:
The Enigmatic Case of Anchoring, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION 79, 80 (Galen V.
Bodenhausen & Alan J. Lambert eds., 2003).
104 See Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 790-94; Wistrich et al., supra note 98, at
1286-93.
105 See Wistrich et al., supra note 98, at 1286-93.
106 Id. at 1332.
107 Id. at 1290.
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TABLE 5: ANCHORING STUDY OF SETILEMENT DEMAND (IN $1,000S)108
Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Control (37) 808 325 700 1000
Anchor (38) 2210 575 1000 3000
In another study, we tested whether a motion to dismiss would
also affect judges' damage awards. 119 We presented participating
judges with a similar fact pattern and asked judges in the control
group, "[H]ow much would you award the plaintiff in compensatory
damages?"1 0 We gave the judges in the anchor group the same back-
ground information, but also told them that "[t]he defendant has
moved for dismissal of the case, arguing that it does not meet the
jurisdictional minimum for a diversity case of $75,000." We asked
these judges to rule on the motion, and then asked them, "If you deny
the motion, how much would you award the plaintiff in compensatory
damages?" Because the plaintiff clearly had incurred damages greater
than $75,000, we viewed the motion as meritless, as did all but two of
the judges.1 1' Nonetheless, the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum
served as an anchor and resulted in lower damage awards from those
judges exposed to it. The judges who had not ruled on the motion
awarded the plaintiff an average of $1,249,000 (and a median of $1
million), while those judges who ruled on the motion to dismiss
awarded the plaintiff an average of $882,000 (and a median of
$882,000).1 12 Thus, the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum anchored
the judges' assessments, as they awarded roughly $350,000 (or nearly
30%) less on average.
TABLE 6: ANCHORING STUDY OF MOTION TO DIsMIss (IN $1000s) 1'"
Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Control (66) 1249 500 1000 1925
Anchor (50) 882 288 882 1000
Both anchoring studies suggest that the anchors had a powerful
influence on judgment. This was true both when the anchor bore
essentially no relation to the magnitude of the claim and when the
judges knew full well that they were supposed to ignore the anchor.
In both cases, the anchor triggered intuitive, automatic processing
that the judges were unable to override.
108 See id.
109 See Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 790.
1 J0 [d. at 790-91.
I See id. at 791.
112 Id. at 791-92. The difference in response rate between the control and anchor
groups was statistically significant. See id. at 791 n.69.
113 ld. at 791-92.
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2. Intuitive Judging-Statistical Inferences
The second example of intuitive judicial decision making arises
from studies of what psychologists call the "representativeness" heuris-
tic. 1 14 When people rely on the representativeness heuristic, they
tend to undervalue statistical information, which can lead to notable
decision errors. 1 5 For example, people tend to discount information
about the frequency with which the underlying category occurs, a phe-
nomenon known as "base rate" neglect.' 16 In one illustrative study,
researchers asked college students to indicate whether a person de-
scribed as being "of high intelligence, although lacking ... creativity"
who "has a high need for order and clarity" and whose "writing is
rather dull" and who seems to have "little sympathy for other people
and does not enjoy interacting with others" was a student in either
computer science or in humanities and education." 17 Although the
participants knew that three times as many graduate students studied
humanities and education as studied computer science, they tended
to guess that the student was in computer science."18 Notwithstanding
the high relevance of base-rate statistics, people discount their proba-
tive value in favor of impressionistic and intuitive reactions to the rep-
resentativeness of the information." 19
To test whether judges would rely on their intuitive assessments
rather than statistical information when presented with a case, we gave
a group of federal magistrate judges the following problem, based on
the classic English case, Byrne v. Boadl. 120
114 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representa-
tiveness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 430 (1972) (first defining the "representativeness" heu-
ristic); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL.
REV. 237, 237 (1973) (expanding on their earlier treatment of the representativeness heu-
ristic) [hereinafter Prediction]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small
Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 105 (1971) (exploring the human tendency to treat a
sample as more representative of a population than is justified by probability theory)
[hereinafter Small Numbers]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive
Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REv. 293, 293 (1983)
(exploring the "conjunction fallacy," a manifestation of the representativeness heuristic);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84, 84-85 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic &
Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (synthesizing the authors' prior work on representativeness);
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 99, at 1124-27 (explaining various decision errors caused
by the representativeness heuristic).
115 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 99, at 1124-27.
116 See Prediction, supra note 114, at 239; see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 99, at
1124.
117 Prediction, supra note 114, at 238.
118 See id. at 239.
119 See id. But see Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Nor-
mative, and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRUN SCI. 1, 1-2 (1996) (arguing that the
proponents of the representativeness heuristic have overstated the extent to which people
actually neglect base rates).
120 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863); see Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 808.
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The plaintiff was passing by a warehouse owned by the defendant
when he was struck by a barrel, resulting in severe injuries. At the
time, the barrel was in the final stages of being hoisted from the
ground and loaded into the warehouse. The defendant's employ-
ees are not sure how the barrel broke loose and fell, but they agree
that either the barrel was negligently secured or the rope was faulty.
Government safety inspectors conducted an investigation of the
warehouse and determined that in this warehouse: (1) when barrels
are negligently secured, there is a 90% chance that they will break
loose; (2) when barrels are safely secured, they break loose only 1%
of the time; (3) workers negligently secure barrels only 1 in 1,000
times. 121
We then asked: "'Given these facts, how likely is it that the barrel that
hit the plaintiff fell due to the negligence of one of the workers?"' 122
The materials then asked the judges to answer by choosing one of
four probability ranges: 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, or 76-100%.
When presented with a problem like this one, most people rely
on their intuition 23 -the accident sounds like it was the product of
negligence, so intuition would suggest negligence must have caused it.
The subjects largely treat the 90% figure as the likelihood that the
accident was the product of negligence, thereby converting the true
meaning of the 90% statistic (the likelihood of injury given negli-
gence) into its inverse (the likelihood of negligence given injury). 124
A deductive approach reveals that the actual probability that the de-
fendant was negligent is only 8.3%.125
Most of the judges who assessed our problem answered it incor-
rectly.' 26 In fact, only about 40% answered correctly and selected the
low range as the actual probability that the accident was the result of
negligence.' 27 Much like the CRT results, the most common wrong
answer (also selected by roughly 40% of the judges) was the intuitive
121 Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 808.
122 Id.
123 See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text (describing how people often react
intuitively based on similarity information rather than analyzing deliberatively using rele-
vant statistical information like base rates).
124 See Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 808-09.
125 See id. at 809 ("Because the defendant is negligent .1% of the time and is 90% likely
to cause an injury under these circumstances, the probability that a victim would be in-
jured by the defendant's negligence is .09% (and the probability that the defendant is
negligent but causes no injury is .01%). Because the defendant is not negligent 99.9% of
the time and is 1% likely to cause an injury under these circumstances, the probability that
on any given occasion a victim would be injured even though the defendant took reasona-
ble care is 0.999% (and the probability that the defendant is not negligent and causes no
injury is 98.901%). As a result, the conditional probability that the defendant is negligent
given that the plaintiff is injured equals .090% divided by 1.089%, or 8.3%.").
126 See id.
127 See id. at 809.
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response that the accident was more than 75% likely to have been the
product of negligence. 128
Compared to other people who have evaluated similar statistical
problems, the judges we studied performed well. Fewer than 20% of
doctors facing a nearly identical problem in a medical context chose
the correct answer. 129 Thus, although many of the judges responded
intuitively, many others responded deliberatively such that the overall
relative performance of judges was admirable.
3. Intuitive Judging-Hindsight
The third example of intuitive judicial decision making comes
from studies of the "hindsight bias."' 30 The hindsight bias is the well-
documented tendency to overestimate the predictability of past
events. 1 3 1 The bias arises from an intuitive sense that the outcome
that actually happened must have been inevitable. People allow their
knowledge to influence their sense of what would have been
predictable. 13 2
Because judges usually evaluate events after the fact, they are vul-
nerable to the hindsight bias.' 33 To explore whetherjudges would be
prone to the hindsight bias, we gave participating judges a hypotheti-
128 See id. at 810.
129 See Ward Casscells, Arno Schoenberger & Thomas B. Graboys, Interpretation by Physi-
cians of Clinical Laboratory Results, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 999-1000 (1978).
130 See generally Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, I J. EXPERiMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
288, 288-99 (1975) (documenting the effects of the hindsight bias).
131 See id.; see also Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and
Biases in Hindsight, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, Supra note
115, at 335, 341-43.
132 See Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the
Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312-13 (1990). To be sure, the hindsight
bias has a deliberative component as well. Knowledge of the outcome seems to affect how
people interpret antecedent circumstances, which seems more deliberative than intuitive.
See id. As we noted above, the relationship between intuition and deliberation can be
complicated.
133 Cf Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAw & HUm. BEHAV. 89, 93, 99 (1995) (finding that the hindsight bias influ-
enced jurors' liability determinations in a simulated negligence case). In addition to influ-
encing determinations of negligence, the hindsight bias likely influences claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel (decisions a lawyer makes in the course of representing a
criminal defendant can seem less competent after the defendant has been convicted), the
levying of sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (a motion or
allegation seems less meritorious after a court rejects it), and assessments of the liability of
corporate officers charged with making false predictions about their company's perform-
ance (which can look like fraud after the predictions fail to come true). SeeJeffreyJ. Rach-
linski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 602-24
(1998). On the relationship between hindsight bias and securities fraud in particular, see
Mitn Gulati, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L.
REV. 773, 824-25 (2004).
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cal fact pattern based on an actual case, labeled "Likely Outcome of
Appeal": 1 -14
In 1991, a state prisoner filed a pro se Section 1983 action in Federal
District Court against the Director of the Department of Criminal
Justice in his state, asserting, among other things, that the prison
had provided him with negligent medical treatment in violation of
Section 1983. The district court dismissed his complaint on the
ground that the provision of negligent medical care does not violate
Section 1983. The district court further found that the plaintiff
knew his claims were not actionable because he had made similar
claims several years earlier in a case that had been dismissed by the
court. Thus, the district court sanctioned the plaintiff pursuant to
Rule 11, ordering him to obtain the permission of the Chief Judge
in the district before filing any more claims. The plaintiff appealed
the district court's decision. ' '3 5
Each judge randomly received one of three conditions: "Af-
firmed," "Vacated," or "Lesser Sanction." Judges in each condition
learned that a different outcome had been obtained on appeal:
" 'Lesser Sanction': 'The court of appeals ruled that the district
court had abused its discretion under Rule 11 and remanded the
case for imposition of a less onerous Rule 11 sanction against the
plaintiff.'
• 'Affirmed': 'The court of appeals affirmed the district court's de-
cision to impose this Rule 11 sanction on the plaintiff.'
* 'Vacated': 'The court of appeals found that the district court had
abused its discretion and vacated the Rule 11 sanction against
the plaintiff.'
We asked the judges in each group the following: "In light of the
facts of the case, as described in the passage above, which of the fol-
lowing possible outcomes of the appeal was most likely to have oc-
curred (assume that the three outcomes below are the only possible
ones)?"
The judges' responses were influenced by learning the outcome
on appeal. Among the judges informed that the court of appeals had
remanded for a lesser sanction, 38.6% asserted that they would have
predicted that outcome, as compared to 7.4% and 20.4% of the
judges whom we informed that the court of appeals had affirmed and
vacated the sanction, respectively.1 36 Among judges whom we in-
formed that the court of appeals had affirmed, 81.5% indicated that
they would have predicted that result, as compared to only 40.4% and
27.8% of judges whom we informed that the court of appeals had or-
1-34 Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 801.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 803 tbl. 2.
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dered a lesser sanction and vacated, respectively. Finally, among
judges whom we informed that the court of appeals had vacated,
51.9% indicated that they would have predicted that result, as com-
pared to only 21.1% and 11.1% ofjudges whom we informed that the
court of appeals had ordered a lesser sanction and affirmed, respec-
tively. The sum of the percentage of judges in each condition who
identified the outcome they were given as the "most likely to have
occurred" was 172%; if knowing the outcome had not influenced the
judges, this sum would have been only 100%. Learning an outcome
clearly influenced the judges' ex post assessments of the ex ante likeli-
hood of various possible outcomes. The intuitive notion that the past
was predictable prevailed.
TABLE 7: HINDSIGHT BIAS APPELLATE OUTCOME STUDY 13 7
Percent selecting Percent selecting Percent selecting
"lesser" as "affirmed" as "vacate" as
outcome outcome outcome
Lesser Group (57) 38.6 40.4 21.1
Affirm Group (54) 7.4 81.5 11.1
Vacate (54) 20.4 27.8 51.9
In another study, however, we found that judges are sometimes
capable of resisting the hindsight bias. 38 Using a problem involving
an assessment of probable cause, we randomly assigned judges to ei-
ther a foresight group or a hindsight group.1 39 We asked the judges
in the foresight group whether they would grant a search warrant
under circumstances we described, and we asked the judges in the
hindsight group to rule on the admissibility of evidence gathered with-
out a warrant under the same circumstances.1 40 We then compared
their responses.
The materials we provided to judges in both groups provided the
same core set of facts. 141 The materials stated that a police officer was
on patrol outside a rock concert. The officer saw a well-dressed, ner-
vous-looking man exit a BMW and fiddle with something in the trunk
before he entered the concert. A half hour later, the officer noticed
that one of the BMW's windows was down. Concerned that someone
might burglarize the car, he approached to close the window. Upon
reaching the car, he "smelled something that he believed, based on a
demonstration at a training session several years earlier, to be burnt
methamphetamine. He looked inside the car and didn't see any
137 Id. at 803 tbl. 2.
138 See Wistiich et al., supra note 98, at 1251-52.
139 See id. at 1314-15.
140 See id. at 1315.
141 See id. (describing the materials in this study).
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drugs, but he did notice some Visine, a local map, and a couple of
empty beer cans."
The judges assigned to the foresight group learned that the po-
lice officer believed that probable cause existed and called to request
a telephonic warrant to search the trunk of the car. We asked these
judges to indicate whether they would issue the telephonic warrant.
The judges assigned to the hindsight group learned that the police
officer conducted a warrantless search of the trunk and found ten
pounds of methamphetamine, other drug paraphernalia, and a re-
cently fired gun that had been used earlier in the day to murder a
drug dealer across town. The police officer arrested the car owner,
who was subsequently prosecuted. During his prosecution, his de-
fense attorney moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the of-
ficer did not have probable cause to search the trunk. We asked these
judges to indicate whether they would admit this evidence.
The responses of the judges in the foresight and hindsight groups
were statistically indistinguishable. In the foresight condition, 23.9%
of the judges indicated that there was probable cause to issue the war-
rant, while in the hindsight condition, 27.7% of the judges found
probable cause to conduct the search and ruled the evidence
admissible. 142
Although the hindsight bias affected judges in the "appeals"
problem, judges demonstrated resistance to the bias in the "probable
cause" problem. The highly intricate, rule-bound nature of Fourth
Amendmentjurisprudence that guides probable cause determinations
might have facilitated the deliberative, System 2 approach. The intri-
cacy of this area of law signals to judges that intuition might be incon-
sistent with the governing law and therefore that they will need to
think carefully through the rules created by the appellate courts. Just
as the apparent intricacies of the "banana and bagel" problem-in
contrast to the "bat and ball" problem-induce decision makers to
deliberate, so too might the complexities of the rules governing prob-
able cause. 143 In contrast, the appeals problem presents no intricate
collection of rules and case law to signal judges that they should not
rely on their intuition.
4. Summary of Intuitive Judging Studies
These results suggest that judges rely heavily on their intuitive
faculties not only when they confront generic problems like the
problems included in the CRT, but also when they face the kinds of
problems they generally see on the bench. When awarding damages,
142 Id.
143 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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assessing liability based on statistical evidence, and predicting out-
comes on appeal, judges seem inclined to make intuitive judgments.
They are also vulnerable to such distractions as absurd settlement de-
mands, unrelated numeric caps, and vivid fact patterns.
But our studies also show that judges can sometimes overcome
their intuitive reactions and make deliberative decisions. Our study of
probable cause revealed that hindsight bias had no effect in certain
contexts. The results of this study were surprising considering the
body of research that we and others 144 have conducted, which would
seem to predict the opposite result.1 45 Together, this work suggests
that judges are inclined, at least when presented with certain stimuli,
to make intuitive decisions, but that they have the capacity to override
intuition with deliberative thinking.
How can we account for the prominent role intuition played in
some of our studies and not in others? On this question, we believe
the results of our two hindsight bias problems are particularly illumi-
nating.1 46 First, trial judges have far more discretion on their choice
of sanctions-at issue in the first hindsight bias problem reported
above-than their determination of probable cause-at issue in the
second hindsight bias problem reported above. The latter area, in
contrast to the former, includes a web of complex rules familiar to
most trial judges. This web of rules might enable trial judges to avoid
the hindsight bias. Second, the questions we asked the judges varied
in a subtle way. In the first problem reported above, we did not ask
them to assess whether the sanction itself was appropriate, but rather
144 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 982-87 (1994) (reporting evidence suggesting thatjudges are prone
to the self-serving or egocentric bias); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1
AMER. L. & ECON. REv. 26, 29 (1999) (finding that 'judges exhibit a variety of biases"); see
also Rachlinski, supra note 133, at 580 ("Virtually every study on judging in hindsight has
concluded that events seem more predictable than they actually are.").
145 But see Rachlinski et al., supra note 98, at 1256-57 (finding, despite evidence of
susceptibility to anchoring and framing, that bankruptcy judges appeared uninfluenced by
omission bias and some emotional factors); Viscusi, supra note 144, at 46-55 (finding,
among judges attending a law and economics conference, little evidence of hindsight
bias).
146 Even in the anchoring and hindsight study of appeals, the fact that we generally
observed statistically significant differences between the control group judges and experi-
mental group judges does not mean that every judge made intuitive decisions. Take, for
example, the anchoring studies described above. See supra Part II.B.I. In those studies, we
found that the group of judges exposed to an anchor responded differently from the
group ofjudges not exposed to that anchor. See id. This does not mean that every judge in
the anchor group made an intuitive judgment; indeed, some judges in the anchor group
resisted the influence of the anchor and responded similarly to the judges in the control
group (just like some judges who took the CRT overcame their intuitive reactions on one,
two, or all of three of the problems). Our results only show that, as a group, the judges
were heavily influenced by their intuition-they do not tell us which judges were influ-
enced and by how much.
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to identify the likely outcome on appeal. Asking them for a predic-
tion rather than a legal ruling might have prompted them to make an
intuitive estimate. In the probable cause problem, by contrast, we
asked the judges to rule on the admissibility of the evidence or to
grant or deny a warrant; as a result, we might have prompted them to
think carefully about a familiar body of case law. So prompted, they
were able to override their intuitive reactions with deliberation.
III
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Building on recent work in psychology, we have proposed an in-
tuitive-override model ofjudging that is less idealistic than the "deduc-
tive" model embraced by the formalists, but also less cynical than the
"intuitive" model embraced by the realists. The results of our CRT
and judicial decision-making studies show that intuition influences ju-
dicial decision making. On balance, the judges we tested performed
like other groups of well-educated adults-they largely based their
judgments on intuition, but also demonstrated some ability to over-
ride intuition with deliberation.
Given the central role that judges play in the justice system both
inside and outside the courtroom, reformers must understand judicial
decision making before they can reshape the justice system to meet
the needs of litigants and society. Our model raises two questions
about judging. First, which decision-making approach-intuitive or
deliberative-is more likely to produce accurate outcomes? Although
we believe that intuition can be surprisingly accurate, we also believe
that an excessive reliance on intuition will lead to erroneous judicial
decisions. Second, how might the justice system encourage judges to
make deliberative rather than intuitive decisions? We identify several
concrete steps that might be taken.
A. Intuitive Versus Deliberative Decision Making
The intuitive approach to decision making is quick, effortless,
and simple, while the deliberative approach to decision making is
slow, effortful, and complex. The obvious advantage of the former is
its speed; judges with heavy dockets can rely on intuition to make
judgments quickly. The apparent advantage to the latter lies in the
care it entails, suggesting that deliberative judgments are more likely
to be accurate. Is this so?
Intuitive judgments are often quite accurate. As Daniel
Kahneman and his long-time collaborator, Amos Tversky, observed in
their early work on heuristics, intuitive thinking is "quite useful" and
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can often lead to accurate decision making. 147 More recently, Gerd
Gigerenzer and his colleagues have demonstrated that intuitive think-
ing can, with "a minimum of time, knowledge, and computation," en-
able decision makers "to make adaptive choices in real environments"
in some circumstances. 148 And recent research suggests that some ex-
perts use intuitive thinking successfully. Consider, for example, the
enormous body of research on chess grandmasters who routinely use
intuitive rather than deliberative strategies to great effect:
[T] he expert relies not so much on an intrinsically stronger power
of analysis as on a store of structured knowledge. When confronted
with a difficult position, a weaker player may calculate for half an
hour, often looking many moves ahead, yet miss the right continua-
tion, whereas a grandmaster sees the move immediately, without
consciously analyzing anything at all. 14
9
This conversion of deliberative judgment into intuitive judgment
might be the hallmark of expertise.' 50
147 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 99, at 1124; see also GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 14
("[Tihere are moments ... when our snap judgments and first impressions can offer a
much better means of making sense of the world.").
148 Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox, in
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART 3, 14 (Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & the
ABC Research Group eds., 1999). For more on "fast and frugal" heuristics, see the other
contributions in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART as well as in BOUNDED RATIONAL-
" - THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2001). Some, like Giger-
enzer, argue that fast-and-frugal heuristics yield results that are superior to those produced
by deductive reasoning. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 719-21 (cataloguing various ways in
which the "experiential" system can outperform the "rational" system).
149 Philip E. Ross, The Expert Mind, Sc. AM., Aug. 2006, at 64, 67; see also ADRIAAN D. DE
GROOT, THOUGHT AND CHOICE IN CHESS (2d ed. 1978) (providing the classic study on deci-
sion making in chess); Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 28, at 51 ("Although System I is
more primitive than System 2, it is not necessarily less capable. On the contrary, complex
cognitive operations eventually migrate from System 2 to System 1 as proficiency and skill
are acquired. A striking demonstration of the intelligence of System I is the ability of chess
masters to perceive the strength or weakness of chess positions instantly."); Gary Klein, The
Fiction of Optimization, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 148, at
103, 115-16 (describing the "progressive deepening" strategy that expert chess players use
in place of the traditional decision analysis); Tom Mueller, Your Move, THE NEW YORKER,
Dec. 12, 2005, at 62, 64 ("Experienced players rely on subconscious faculties known vari-
ously as pattern recognition, visualization, and aesthetic sense. All are forms of educated
guesswork-aids to making choices when certainty through exhaustive calculation is im-
possible-and may be summed up in a word: intuition. Even a novice player uses intuition
to exclude most moves as pointless, and the more advanced a player becomes the less he
needs to calculate."). More generally, research suggests that "[e]xperts notice features and
meaningful patterns of information that are not noticed by novices." Nat'l Research Coun-
cil, How PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL 31 Uohn D. Bransford,
Ann L. Brown & Rodney R. Cocking eds., 2000).
150 See HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 204 ("Many processes or reactions to stimuli that
once relied heavily on the deliberate system can over time become automatic and thus
bypass consciousness. This migration from the deliberate system to the tacit [system] is an
important characteristic of the phenomenon of expertise.").
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Nevertheless, there is reason to be suspicious of intuitive decision
making in court. As Tversky and Kahneman observed, intuitive think-
ing also can "lead to severe and systematic errors."'15 ' In our own
work, we have observed that judges who responded intuitively on the
CRT made inaccurate choices. 152 On the judicial decision-making
problems, which are obviously more relevant to appraising the relative
merits of intuition versus deliberation in court, judges who employed
intuitive thinking allowed an irrelevant settlement demand to influ-
ence their damage awards, 153 allowed an impressionistic assessment of
statistical evidence to shape their liability determinations, 154 and al-
lowed outcome information to influence their assessments of the ex
ante predictability of appellate courts. 55 In these cases, intuitive, heu-
ristic-based decision making led the judges to make erroneous deci-
sions that they probably would have avoided had they adopted a
deliberative approach.
Moreover, intuition is also the likely pathway by which undesir-
able influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, af-
fect the legal system. 1 56 Today, the overwhelming majority of judges
in America explicitly reject the idea that these factors should influ-
ence litigants' treatment in court, but even the most egalitarian
among us may harbor invidious mental associations. 57 For example,
most white adults are more likely to associate African-Americans than
white Americans with violence, 5 8 and most Americans are more likely
to associate women with family life than with professional careers. 59
These associations seem to reflect automatic, intuitive judgments, 60
while active deliberation limits such biases.1
6
'
Furthermore, the capacity to use intuitive thinking successfully
may require years of "effortful study" 16 2 as well as accurate and relia-
151 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 99, at 1124.
152 See supra Part H.A.
153 See supra Part II.B.1.
154 See supra Part II.B.2.
155 See supra Part II.B.3.
156 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969,
976 (2006) (describing how race operates as a System 1 influence on judgment).
157 SeeJerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1512-14 (2005) (re-
viewing the evidence on implicit invidious associations).
158 See id. at 1515 n.117.
159 See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action, "94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006) ("[S]eventy-five percent of men and
women do not associate female with career as easily as they associate female to family.").
160 SeeJolls & Sunstein, supra note 156, at 973-74.
161 See id. at 974-75.
162 Ross, supra note 149, at 69 (describing K. Anders Ericsson's concept of "effortful
study" whereby one "continually tackles challenges that lie just beyond one's compe-
tence"). See generally THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE
(K. Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul J. Feltovich & Robert R. Hoffman eds., 2006)
(providing a collection of articles on the study of cognitive skill and expertise).
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ble feedback on earlier judgments. 163 Unlike chess grandmasters,
judges are unlikely to obtain accurate and reliable feedback on most
of the judgments they make; indeed, they are only likely to receive
external validation (or invalidation) of the accuracy of their judg-
ments when their rulings are challenged on appeal. 164 The appeals
process, however, does not provide reliable feedback. Many cases set-
tle before appellate courts resolve the appeal; collateral policy con-
cerns influence the outcome of some appeals, clouding the meaning
of appellate decisions for the trial judge; and finally, appeals com-
monly take years to resolve, heavily diluting the value of any feedback.
Moreover, the standards of review require appellate courts to give def-
erence to trial judges on many of their discretionary decisions. 165 By
the time an appellate court decides an appeal, the trial judge may
have forgotten the nuances of the case, the law may have changed, or
the judge may have retired or switched assignments. It is thus not
surprising that we found no differences in CRT performance based on
judges' experience or length of service. Unlike chess grandmasters,
judges operate in an environment that does not allow them to perfect
their intuitive decision-making processes.
Other aspects of the litigation process make it even more difficult
for judges to receive good feedback. First, judges may have a narrow
role in a case that precludes them from learning what happens later.
For example, civil master calendar judges or criminal arraignment cal-
endar judges might think that their decisions are correct, but they
seldom learn how their decisions affect later proceedings in a case.
Second, judges seldom receive useful feedback from lawyers or liti-
gants. Lawyers usually say nothing to the judge about the quality of
the judge's performance. When they do, judges easily discount such
comments as biased. Third,judges are poorly positioned to learn how
their decisions affect the world beyond the immediate case in front of
them. Unlike legislators, they usually do not learn how their decisions
affected subsequent conduct or events. Indeed, critics of the com-
mon-law process often base their criticism in part on this lack of
feedback. 166
Given the limitations of intuitive decision making, how exactly
can judges (or anyone, for that matter) override their intuition with
163 See HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 208.
164 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Overall, the rate of affirmance on appeal
is quite high, at least in the federal courts. See Guthrie & George, supra note 17, at 361
fig.Ib.
165 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
166 See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLIcN, 53-56 (1977). But see
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 964
(2006) (noting that courts might be better capable of handling "social problems that pro-
duce vivid disasters" than are legislatures).
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deliberation? Professor Robin Hogarth provides an excellent
example:
To illustrate, let us [ ]consider George, the dermatologist, who is
examining a patient who has a growth below the right eye. When
he first sees the growth, George has an immediate intuitive reaction.
He has seen many growths in the past, although not necessarily be-
low the right eye. However, the similarity between this growth and
others of a particular type is striking. He just sees the resemblance
without having to expend mental effort. This is George's tacit sys-
tem in action. Yet George also knows that errors are made identify-
ing growths. He therefore deliberately checks various features of
this particular growth against a mental checklist in order to query
his initial diagnosis. This second process is deliberative. It involves
recalling details of codified medical knowledge. It involves atten-
tion and mental effort. This is the deliberative system at work.
167
Consistent with this example, we do not suggest that judges should
reject intuition in all cases. Rather, we suggest that judges should use
deliberation as a verification mechanism especially in those cases
where intuition is apt to be unreliable either because feedback is ab-
sent or because judges face cues likely to induce misleading reliance
on heuristics. 16 8
B. Inducing Deliberation
If judges need to use deliberation to override intuition, then the
justice system should encourage that process. Of course, features of
the existing justice system exist for many reasons, and efforts to en-
courage deliberation might have negative effects on other aspects of
the system. Our goal here is simply to identify steps that the system
could take to facilitate deliberation while recognizing that reformers
would have to balance the benefits associated with these reforms
against any costs they might impose.
Psychologists have determined that the decision-making ap-
proach one employs depends largely on "features of the task and of
the individual."' 69 Some features of a judge's tasks are not easily
changed, but the environment in which judges perform their work
could be more "kind," to use Robin Hogarth's term. 170 A "kind" envi-
ronment allows intuition to flourish by providing immediate, high-
quality feedback about the causes and consequences of errors.
1 7 1
Consider the following example of a "kind" environment:
167 HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 22.
168 See Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 822-25.
169 Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 28, at 51.
170 See HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 89.
171 See id. at 88-89.
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The professional tennis player ... [who] has played tennis almost
every day since she was a child and has developed her intuitions
about where to hit the ball on the basis of highly accurate feedback
from coaches, personal experience in many matches (where the
consequences of various shots are immediately and unmistakably
apparent), and watching and analyzing other players' matches.
Consequently, all her intuitions have been acquired within kind
learning structures. There is no doubt in my mind that, during
matches, her intuitions will be valid. (This does not mean, of
course, that her choices will always be correct or that she will always
execute shots precisely as she intends.) 172
On the other hand, consider the following example of a "wicked"
or "unkind" learning environment:
Now consider physicians working in a hospital emergency room-a
classic case of a wicked learning environment. Rarely do emergency
room staff see the outcome of treatment. In cases of minor injury
or illness, follow-up care is provided by the patient's own physician
after discharge. In cases of more serious injury or illness, patients
are transferred to a different ward for further evaluation and follow-
up care. Emergency room staff therefore cannot rely on long-term
feedback; they can observe only what happens in the short term.
They also have few opportunities to experiment and often no way of
knowing whether the task at hand is lenient (many conditions can
be treated with antibiotics) or exacting (shortness of breath is symp-
tomatic of many conditions, some minor, some potentially life
threatening). 173
Unfortunately, a judge's on-the-job intuitions generally develop
in "wicked" environments. Judges sometimes function like emer-
gency-room physicians in that they handle only part of a case. They
may observe how well or how poorly things go while they are directly
involved, but they often do not learn how things went at a later stage,
so they cannot gauge the long-term effectiveness of their decisions.
For example, a judge who decides whether to detain or release a par-
ticular defendant pending trial may not learn whether the defendant
actually appeared for trial. In addition, errors seldom have direct ad-
verse consequences forjudges-when the judge slips, the litigant falls.
This reality compounds the problems caused by the paucity of mean-
ingful feedback. Even though mostjudges are conscientious and hard
working, indirect consequences may be insufficient to guarantee good
or improved performance. Reversal on appeal directly affects judges,
but appeals occur infrequently and are seldom motivating. 174 Finally,
172 Id. at 89-90.
173 Id. at 218.
174 See David E. Klein & RobertJ. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court
Compliance, 37 LAw & Soc'y REv. 579, 597-98 (2003); Donald R. Songer, Martha Hum-
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although most judges want their colleagues to respect them, 175 one
judge seldom learns the details of another judge's potentially errone-
ous decision making.
Little can be done about many of the aspects of the legal system
that contribute to judges' "wicked" learning environments. The sys-
tem can rectify other features, however, such as the amount of time
that judges have to make rulings, the potential disciplining effect of
opinion writing, the amount of training and feedback judges receive,
the use of scripts, checklists, and multifactor tests in judging, and the
allocation of decision-making resources.
1. Time
The justice system might expand the amount of time judges have
to make decisions. Judges facing cognitive overload 176 due to heavy
dockets 7 7 or other on-the-job constraints are more likely to make in-
tuitive rather than deliberative decisions because the former are
speedier and easier.1 78 Furthermore, being cognitively "busy" induces
judges to rely on intuitive judgment. 179 As many of thejudges we have
studied candidly admit, time pressures present an enormous chal-
lenge, often inducing less-than-optimal decision making.
No easy cure for time pressure exists, but the justice system could
employ a few strategies to mitigate it. Most obviously, legislatures
could expand the number of authorized judgeships in their jurisdic-
tions, particularly in those areas with the heaviest dockets, thereby en-
abling judges to spend more time per case and per decision. This
would be costly and it is unclear that the benefits would offset the
costs. In particular, adding more judgeships might make litigation
more attractive to those who would otherwise find alternative ways of
resolving their disputes, just as adding more highways makes driving
phries Ginn & Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow the Law when There Is No Fear of Reversal?,
24JusT. SYs. J. 137, 137 (2003).
175 See BAUM, supra note 11, at 50-60.
176 See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004) (ex-
ploring various ways in which the availability of many options and much information can
compromise the quality of decision making); see also Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's
Box? The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IowA L. REv. 601, 651 (2003) (concluding that
multiple options can impose costs in decision making).
177 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461, 462-63 tbl. 1 (2004) (observ-
ing a five-fold increase in dispositions in federal courts from 1962-2002).
178 See Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect
Heuristic inJudgments of Risks and Benefits, 13J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 1, 8 (2000) (find-
ing that subjects were more likely to rely on intuitive, heuristic-driven decision making
rather than on deliberative decision making when operating under time pressure).
179 See Gilbert, supra note 46, at 179 ("The busyness-induced undercorrection of dispo-
sitional inferences is now a well-established and widely replicated phenomenon.").
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more attractive to those who would otherwise find alternative means
of transportation. 8 0
Minimizing the number of spur-of-the-moment decisions that
judges are expected to make might also help. Our model suggests
that decisions made during pretrial conferences, settlement confer-
ences, motion hearings, and so forth are more likely to be intuitive
and impressionistic rather than deliberative and well reasoned. Like-
wise, evidentiary rulings at trial are apt to be more prone to error than
are those rulings made before trial. When ruling on the admissibility
of evidence at trial, judges often have little choice but to think intui-
tively. Our model suggests that judges should not make important
evidentiary rulings in such a setting. To be sure, motions in limine
deprive the judge of the context in which the evidence will be heard.
Nonetheless, we suggest that judges might require parties to file their
more important evidentiary motions before trial, but delay ruling on
them until the issues arise during the trial, and even then after a re-
cess in which the judge has had some time to study the papers and
deliberate.
Taking time to deliberate rather than relying on intuition might
not always produce better judgments. For example, if a judge has to
determine whether a witness is being truthful, the judge's intuitive
decision based on observing the witness's behavior might be more ac-
curate than a deliberative decision made in chambers days after the
details have faded. On the other hand, there are times when careful
deliberation is desirable. Ifjudges are susceptible to the "beauty bias,"
for example, they might evaluate an attractive witness's credibility too
positively and an unattractive witness's credibility too negatively if they
make a hasty judgment in the courtroom.18 ' A reflective determina-
tion made in chambers after the impact of the witness's appearance
has worn off might be more accurate.
2. Opinion Writing
The justice system also might require judges to write opinions
more often.1 8 2 In some respects, this prescription conflicts with the
previous measure because opinion writing takes an enormous amount
of time, which judges might not have. Despite this cost, writing opin-
180 See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 545, 547
(2004).
181 SeeJudith H. Langlois, Lisa Kalakanis, AdamJ. Rubenstein, Andrea Larson, Monica
Hallam & Monica Smoot, Maxims or Myths of Beauty? A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review,
126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 390, 399-401 (2000).
182 Judges generally disclose the reasons behind their actions, and they are often re-
quired to do so. See, e.g., FED. R. Cir. P. 52(a) (requiring findings of fact after a bench
trial). Arguably, judges already explain the reasons for their decisions more frequently
and completely than any other public officials.
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ions could induce deliberation that otherwise would not occur.
Rather than serving merely to describe an allegedly deliberative pro-
cess that has already occurred (as the formalists might argue) or to
rationalize an intuitive decision already made (as the realists might
argue), the discipline of opinion writing might enable well-meaning
judges to overcome their intuitive, impressionistic reactions.' 1 3 The
process of writing might challenge the judge to assess a decision more
carefully, logically, and deductively. 8 4
Preparing a written opinion is sometimes too inconvenient or
simply infeasible. In such situations, perhaps judges should be re-
quired to articulate the basis for the decision before announcing the
conclusion. Though there is little opportunity for reflection in these
situations, simply stating the reasons for the decision before the ruling
is announced may encourage the judge to be more deliberative.
The psychological literature on the effects of requiring decision
makers to provide reasons is mixed. Providing reasons for one's deci-
sion induces deliberation, 18 5 but can also impair performance on
tasks that benefit from intuition.8 6 Some studies suggest that deliber-
183 Some have encouraged the preparation of written opinions for exactly this reason.
See, e.g., Moses Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49 CAl. L. REV. 831,
838 (1961) ("Where ajudge need write no opinion, his judgment may be faulty. Forced to
reason his way step by step and set down these steps in black and white, he is compelled to
put salt on the tail of his reasoning to keep it from fluttering away."); Robert A. Leflar, Some
Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUm. L. REV. 810, 810 (1961) ("[T]he neces-
sity for preparing a formal opinion assures some measure of thoughtful review of the facts
in a case and of the law's bearing upon them. Snap judgments and lazy preferences for
armchair theorizing ... are somewhat minimized."); RogerJ. Traynor, Some Open Questions
on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 218 (1957) ("In sixteen years I
have not found a better test for the solution of a case than its articulation in writing, which
is thinking at its hardest. Ajudge, inevitably preoccupied with the far-reaching effect of an
immediate solution as a precedent, often discovers that his tentative views will not jell in
the writing. He wrestles with the devil more than once to set forth a sound opinion that
will be sufficient unto more than the day."). But see Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition,
and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2008) (arguing gener-
ally that verbalization does not always enhance understanding or decision making, particu-
larly when important aspects of the situation are not readily susceptible to verbalization).
184 See HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 262 ("[W]hen explicitly asked about the rationale
behind their choices, people will change their choices if those choices are not consistent
with the reasons that they are able to produce. Thus, if deliberation were structured to
highlight 'good' reasons, outcomes might well be better than initial intuition.").
185 See id. at 263 ("Verbalization ... forces people to act in [a] deliberate mode and
cuts off access to tacit processes.").
186 SeeJohn McMackin & Paul Slovic, When Does Explicit Justification Impair Decision Mak-
ing?, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 527, 535-39 (2000) (finding that asking subjects to
provide reasons adversely affected their performance on intuitive tasks, such as indicating
which advertisement people would prefer, but improved their performance on analytical
tasks, such as estimating the length of the Amazon River); Timothy D. Wilson &Jonathan
W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Deci-
sions, 60J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. 181, 181 (1991) (finding that subjects' preferred
choices of strawberry jam were less likely to correspond with experts' preferred choices if
the subjects were required to give reasons for their choices).
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ation can sometimes produce results that are inferior to results pro-
duced by intuition, particularly where a task involves aesthetic
judgment. 187 We suspect, however, that most of the judgments that
judges make are not the sort that are impaired by deliberation.
3. Training and Feedback
Just as there is continuing legal education for lawyers, there also
is continuing legal education forjudges. Thejustice system could pro-
vide even more training opportunities for judges and invest more re-
sources in the kinds of judicial training most likely to facilitate
deliberative decision making. Several studies suggest that statistical
training in particular, though certainly not a panacea, 188 increases the
likelihood that individuals will make rational, deliberative decisions
rather than intuitive, heuristic-driven ones. 89
Training could help judges understand the extent of their reli-
ance on intuition and identify when such reliance is risky-the neces-
sary first steps in self-correction. Judges could learn to interrupt their
intuition, thereby allowing deliberation to intervene and modify be-
havior, if not actually altering underlying prejudices or attitudes. 190
Additionally, providing judges with instruction and practice in scien-
tific reasoning hopefully would teach them to employ deductive rea-
soning either deliberatively or, if the instruction and practice is
187 See Timothy D. Wilson, Douglas J. Lisle, Jonathan W. Schooler, Sara D. Hodges,
Kristen J. Klaaren & Suzanne J. LaFleur, Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice
Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331, 337 (1993) (finding that experi-
mental subjects who chose a poster to take home based on intuition were more pleased
with their choice than those who were required to deliberate before selecting a poster).
188 See, e.g., Small Numbers, supra note 114, at 107-09 (finding evidence of intuitive and
heuristic-driven thinking even among mathematically oriented psychologists).
189 See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RisKs: How TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS
DECEIVE You 229-46 (2002) (exploring how the population can be taught to understand
risk information); Franca Agnoli, Development ofJudgmental Heuristics and Logical Reasoning:
Training Counteracts the Representativeness Heuristic, 6 COGNITIVE DEV. 195, 195 (1991) (show-
ing that statistical training improved children's reasoning abilities); Franca Agnoli & David
H. Krantz, Suppressing Natural Heuristics by Formal Instruction: The Case of the Conjunction Fal-
lacy, 21 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 515, 515 (1989) (showing that statistical training improved the
reasoning abilities of adult subjects with limited prior exposure to mathematics); Richard
P. Larrick, James N. Morgan & Richard E. Nisbett, Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning
in Everyday Life, 1 PSYCHOL. Sci. 362, 362 (1990) (showing that cost-benefit training im-
proved decision making); Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, ChristopherJepson & Ziva
Kunda, The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 339,
339 (1983) (identifying several ways in which statistical training can improve the intuitive
reasoning people generally employ); see also HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 23 ("[I] ntuition is
like expertise. It is specific to particular domains. It is acquired through domain-relevant
experience. And it can be improved through instruction and practice.").
190 See HOGARTH, supra note 20, at 209 ("Just as we cannot avoid tacitly forming
prejudices, we cannot avoid forming a good first impression of con men. But we can learn
not to act uncritically on the basis of that first impression.").
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especially effective, automatically.' 19 Judges also could receive help
identifying which aspects of their environments are "wicked" and how
to improve them.
Likewise, jurisdictions could adopt peer-review processes to pro-
vide judges with feedback. For example, every two years, three exper-
ienced judges from other jurisdictions could visit a target court. They
could select a few cases recently decided by each target court judge,
read all of the rulings and transcripts, and then provide the judges
with feedback on their performance and constructive suggestions for
improvement. This would give judges an opportunity to obtain feed-
back on issues that typically escape appellate review. When aggre-
gated, the results of such a process might also identify structural
problems that amendments to rules or statutes should remedy. Such
a procedure also would increase judicial accountability by subjecting
decisions that escape appellate review to peer review. Research has
shown that accountability of this sort can improve decision-making
performance. 192 If a peer-review process is infeasible, courts could at
a minimum record and provide judges with outcome data on relevant
decisions-for example, whether a defendant released on bail actually
appeared for trial. Armed with this feedback, judges might be better
able to learn what they are doing well and what they are doing poorly.
Of course, most judges are generalists, 19 3 which might impede
their efforts to learn good decision-making skills and to accept mean-
ingful feedback through training and peer-review processes. With the
exception of the tasks judges perform repeatedly, it might take a long
time for judges to acquire sufficient experience in handling a particu-
lar issue to accumulate enough feedback to avoid errors. It is as if a
professional tennis player divided his or her time among tennis, vol-
191 See Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1074-75 (2002)
(advocating that judges engage in an elaborate program of self-examination and delibera-
tion in an effort to eliminate or mitigate bias resulting from automatic, mindless impulses).
The author's program strikes us as somewhat impractical, even though it is motivated by
concerns very much like our own.
192 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accounta-
bility, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 256-59 (1999). The authors explain that decision makers
are more likely to engage in self-critical thinking if they learn prior to making their deci-
sions that they will be accountable to an audience whose views are unknown, who is well-
informed, and who has a legitimate reason for evaluating the decision makers'judgments.
See id. at 259.
193 See David L. Faigman, Judges as "Amateur Scientists," 86 B.U. L. REv. 1207, 1209
(2006) ("By its nature, law requires judges to be generalists"); William K. Ford, Judging
Expertise in Copyright Law, 14J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2006) ("U]udges are generalists who
have jurisdiction over an enormous range of legal disputes: copyright law one day, environ-
mental law the next, antitrust the day after that."); Rachlinski et al., supra note 98, at 1228
('judges . . . have historically been generalists who preside over any and all cases.");
Jonathan Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and
the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 265 (2007) (describing "reliance on
generalist judges" as one of the "[c]entral features of the common-law system").
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leyball, softball, soccer, and golf rather than concentrating on ten-
nis-the player's opportunity to develop "tennis intuition" would
diminish. Although we have concluded elsewhere that specialization
may not insulate judges from cognitive illusions such as anchoring, 194
it might mitigate such biases by maximizing the opportunity to benefit
from a large quantity of relevant feedback. Moreover, because the
benefit of experiential learning in a wicked environment is limited,
training may be necessary to compensate for deficiencies in the learn-
ing environment. 1 95
4. Scripts, Checklists, and Multifactor Tests
Scripts and checklists can free judges from reliance on their
memories and encourage them to proceed methodically, thereby en-
suring that they touch all of the deliberative bases. Ajudge who must
review a script or checklist at each step in the decision-making process
is less likely to rely on intuition when doing so is inadvisable.
In some respects, the justice system already takes this approach.
Judges receive "scripts" for some tasks when they are appointed. 96
Judges also develop their own scripts and checklists for various tasks
and share them with one another.' 97 In addition, multifactor or bal-
ancing tests have become common. Examples include the five-factor
test for inadvertent waiver of privileged documents; 98 the seven- or
eight-factor test for cost shifting in the context of electronic discov-
ery;199 the five-factor test for dismissal for failure to prosecute or com-
ply with an order;200 the four-factor test for evaluating speedy trial
right violations;20' and the multifactor test for determining the likeli-
hood of consumer confusion in trademark infringement cases.202
194 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 98, at 1236-37. But see Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REv. 2017, 2022 (2006)
(finding that insurers are less susceptible than lay litigants to the anchoring effect).
195 Baruch Fischhoff, Heuristics and Biases in Application, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at 730, 731 ("Training provides feed-
back that everyday life typically lacks, allowing people to test and refine judgment skills.").
196 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (4th ed.
1996, rev. 2000).
197 See E-mail correspondence among Magistrate Judges of the United States District
Court foi the Central District of California (Dec. 15, 2004) (on file with author).
198 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 177-78 (C.D. Cal.
2001).
199 See, e.g., Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428-29
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
200 See, e.g., Valley Eng'rs, Inc. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir.
1998).
201 See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
202 See, e.g.,Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying
the multifactor test developed in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th
Cir. 1979), and criticizing the practice of considering merely some factors).
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Although multifactor tests are ubiquitous, they are imperfect.
Some multifactor tests are poorly designed and include inappropriate
factors that duplicate or overlap with other factors within the test.
When judges excessively rely on multifactor tests, as well as on scripts
and checklists, there is a risk of mechanical jurisprudence. Excessive
rigidity may unduly restrict judges from tailoring their analysis to the
case. Further, multifactor or balancing tests may be indeterminate,
and applying or weighing some of the factors within the test may re-
quire intuition. Finally, judges sometimes employ heuristics to cir-
cumvent the multifactor analysis by relying on just a few of the factors
in making their decision, thereby diminishing the value of the test as a
corrective device. 2
0 3
Nevertheless, such tests possess the potential for mitigating cogni-
tive error by nudging judges toward more deliberative processes. Mul-
tifactor tests can help ensure that judges consider all relevant factors
and can remind them of their responsibility to base decisions on more
than mere intuition. 20 4 Similar reminder systems have reduced medi-
cal diagnostic error.20 5 Thus, a system that forces judges to weigh
each of the factors expressly also might help reduce judges' reliance
on intuition. This may be the reason that some appellate courts re-
quire administrative agencies or lower courts to expressly consider or
weigh each of the factors in a multifactor test, sometimes in a particu-
lar sequence. 2° 6 In their more extreme forms, such techniques are
203 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Mullifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1581-82 (2006).
204 See Chip Heath, Richard P. Larrick & Joshua Klayman, Cognitive Repairs: How Orga-
nizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 1, 15 (1998) ("[I]ndividuals attend to and process information more comprehen-
sively when they have a mental schema that tells them what information is needed in a give
situation and where to find it.").
205 See Padmanabhan Ramnarayan, Andrew Winrow, Michael Coren, Vasanta Nanduri,
Roger Buchdahl, Benjamin Jacobs, Helen Fisher, Paul M. Taylor, Jeremy C. Wyatt &Joseph
Britto, Diagnostic Omission Errors in Acute Paediatric Practice: Impact of a Reminder System on
Decision-Making, 6 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 37, 37-38 (2006) ,available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/6/37 (reporting that physicians' use of an In-
ternet-based diagnostic reminder system improved diagnostic workups and reduced diag-
nostic omission errors; the reminder system reduced unsafe diagnostic workups from
45.2% to 32.7%); see also Paul R. Dexter, Susan Perkins, J. Marc Overhage, Kati Maharry,
Richard B. Kohler & ClementJ. McDonald, A Computerized Reminder System to Increae the Use
of Prevention Care for Hospitalized Patients, 345 NEw ENG. J. MED. 965, 965 (2001) (reporting
similarly positive results from use of a computerized reminder system to remind physicians
to deliver preventive care to hospital patients).
206 See, e.g., Ng v. I.N.S., 804 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e require that the BIA
state its reasons and show proper consideration of all factors when weighing equities ....
[T]his court cannot assume that the BIA considered factors that it failed to mention in its
decision."); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Pope, 308 B.R. 55, 59 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("[T]he
Ninth Circuit adopted a three-part undue hardship test .... [C]ourts must consider each
element [of the test] in turn and, where one of the three elements is not met, the court
must stop there with a finding of no dischargability."); Frankel v. Frankel, 886 A.2d 136,
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known as "forcing functions," which are exemplified by computer sys-
tems that force the user to complete step two before moving to step
three. 207
5. Reallocation of Decision-Making Authority
The justice system might also take procedural steps to limit
judges' exposure to stimuli that are likely to trigger intuitive thinking.
This might be done in several ways, but we think the most promising
approach is for courts to expand their use of what we call "divided
decision making." By way of illustration, consider the first anchoring
study described above, in which a preposterous $10 million demand
made at a settlement conference influenced judges' damage
awards.20 8 By dividing decision making between judges-for example,
by assigning managerial functions to one judge and adjudicative func-
tions to another-the justice system could prevent such an anchor
from influencing a trial judge's determination of damages. The jus-
tice system could also achieve this end by separating decision-making
authority between judge and jury-for example, by exposing the
judge, but not the jurors, to potentially misleading inadmissible evi-
dence. More generally, this divided decision-making strategy is likely
to shield the ultimate adjudicator from various stimuli that are likely
to induce intuitive, heuristic-based decision making.
There are some impediments to expanding the use of divided
decision making beyond existing boundaries. For example, litigants
are entitled to jury trials in only certain cases. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the costs of some forms of divided decision making, such as
assigning two judges to every case, could be quite high. Still, this ap-
proach has much to offer.
6. Summary
In short, there are numerous ways in which the civil and criminal
justice systems can increase the likelihood that judges will make more
deliberative decisions. Each of these reforms tends to make decision
making more costly or time consuming, and some of the reforms,
154 (Md. App. 2005) ("A trial judge must consider each factor listed ... when determining
the amount of monetary award.").
207 See Mads Soegaard, Forcing Functions, http://www.interaction-design.org/encyclo-
pedia/forcingfunctions.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007) ("A forcing function is an aspect
of a design that prevents the user from taking an action without consciously considering
information relevant to that action. It forces conscious attention upon something... and
thus deliberately disrupts the efficient or automatised [sic] performance of a task.... It
is... useful in situations where the behavior of the user is skilled, as in performing routine
or well-known tasks. Execution of this type of task[ ] is often partly or wholly automatized,
requiring few or no attentional resources .... and it can thus be necessary to 'wake the
user up' by deliberately disrupting the performance of the task.").
208 See supra Part II.B.1.
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such as divided decision making, might be sufficiently cumbersome
that they do not justify the extra costs imposed on litigants and the
justice system. Still, gains in accuracy, and therefore justice, may be
worth the costs of reform.
CONCLUSION
We believe that most judges attempt to "reach their decisions
utilizing facts, evidence, and highly constrained legal criteria, while
putting aside personal biases, attitudes, emotions, and other individu-
ating factors."20 9 Despite their best efforts, however, judges, like eve-
ryone else, have two cognitive systems for making judgments-the
intuitive and the deliberative-and the intuitive system appears to
have a powerful effect on judges' decision making. The intuitive ap-
proach might work well in some cases, but it can lead to erroneous
and unjust outcomes in others. The justice system should take what
steps it can to increase the likelihood thatjudges will decide cases in a
predominately deliberative, rather than a predominately intuitive,
way.
In his recent book, How Doctors Think, Dr. Jerome Groopman ob-
serves that "[m]uch has been made of the power of intuition, and
certainly initial impressions formed in a flash can be correct. But as
we hear from a range of physicians, relying too heavily on intuition
has its perils. Cogent medical judgments meld first impressions-ge-
stalt-with deliberate analysis."210 Like cogent medical judgments, co-
gent legal judgments call for deliberation. Justice depends on it.
209 Donald C. Nugent,judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). For a less optimis-
tic take on judicial performance, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 431
(2004) (examining "bad judges" who are "incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, or
corrupt").
210 JEROME GROOPMAN, How DocroRs THINK 9 (2007).
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